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Abstract 
This paper surveys studies of the importance of Central Asian small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) in the economy and their experience during the Russian financial crisis. It 
also uses survey data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys to infer noteworthy 
characteristics, features, and dependencies on financing of Central Asian SMEs and, 
consequently, derive the potential impact of the crisis on the sector. The paper also 
assesses government support for SMEs and the necessary market reforms that will give a 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Major stumbles in economic growth have had something to do with banking system 
problems. This was true of the Great Depression, true with the Asian financial crisis, and 
now again with the current global financial crisis. The illiquidity in the global financial market 
has affected the world, halting more than a decade of exuberant economic growth. It has 
particularly impinged on trade through reduced provision and high cost of trade finance. 
Problems in finance impact business operations, and usually especially affect the small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) more. Thus, there is a need to focus research on SMEs 
and their performance during this time of crisis. 
The chapter focuses on SMEs in Central Asia
1. SMEs in the former Soviet Republics were 
newly born following the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991. While 
they quickly adapted to the new market economy, they struggled through the very 
challenging transition period characterized by, among other problems, an institutional 
vacuum. Then, when the economy had relatively normalized, the Russian financial crisis hit 
them towards the end of the 1990s. Now, after experiencing stable growth throughout the 
first half of this decade, the global financial crisis is again threatening to undo many of their 
past gains.  
The paper surveys SME importance and noteworthy features, and tries to assess, based on 
past surveys and in the absence of available official information, the likely impact of the crisis 
on this sector. Everywhere, government support is important for the development of SMEs, 
but in Central Asia, good economic stewardship and appropriate implementation of 
regulations by the government are more critical than any other form of government financial 
support.  
The paper first provides a broad–brush discussion of how a financial crisis affects the real 
economy, the central role of banks in the lubrication of trade transactions, and why SMEs 
have difficulties accessing bank financing in general and trade finance in particular. Section 
3 provides an overview of the Central Asian economy and discusses SMEs importance and 
discernible characteristics and features. Section 4 and Section 5 put forward a few pieces of 
evidence on the impact of the 1998 Russian and the current global financial crises on SMEs, 
drawing heavily from inferences based on firm surveys conducted in 1999 and 2005. The 
paper relies heavily on the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS, or BEEP Survey) conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) to derive plausible conclusions on the likely effect on SMEs of the two 
crises, basing them on sector characteristics and features as well as revealed perceptions 
by the respondent firms. Section 6 discusses government support of SMEs, particularly their 
financing needs and problems. Section 7 summarizes and provides policy 
recommendations.  
2.  FINANCIAL CRISIS, SMES, AND THE ECONOMY 
2.1  Channels of Transmission From Finance to the Real Economy 
The economic literature has identified various channels through which financial crises 
spread to the real economy
2. There is a monetary channel, as well as channels for credit, 
bank capital, wealth effects, exchange rate, uncertainty and cost of capital that provides 
various explanations as to how, starting from a financial crisis, real economic output gets 
                                                  
1 Central Asia is composed of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
2 See Furceri and Mourougane (2009). Box 6 in their paper talks about transmission mechanisms from banking 
crises to activity.  
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depressed. Often, these channels may be active at the same time; for example, as a 
currency crisis ensues from the financial crisis—causing a rise in interest rates and 
bankruptcies as well as significant drops in domestic output and employment—significant 
asset price reductions can take place at the same time, leading to a decline in private 
consumption (wealth effect) and, thus, to further drops in output. For the current global 
financial crisis, the bank capital channel and credit channel may be the most relevant 
transmission mechanisms to understand. The ‘bank capital channel’ holds that financial 
crises can erode bank capital, making banks extremely averse to lend, thus leading to a 
deeper economic downturn (Bernanke, Lown, and Friedman 1991). The ‘credit channel’ 
argues that during financial crisis, banks tighten their lending standards and reduce credit 
availability. These credit constraints lower consumption and investment, thus worsening the 
economic downturn. Moreover, the credit channel holds that, on the demand side, the crisis 
reduces the value of collateral and thereby the ability of firms and households to borrow, 
leading once again to a deeper domestic output cut. Either of these transmission channels is 
likely to be the main reason for the current global slump. 
Whether the increased risk aversion exhibited by banks is due to weak capitalization or 
merely motivated by extreme cautiousness, the effect is a cutback in available funds for 
trade finance which, in turn, impinge on the volume of trade. Trade finance is considered a 
relatively low-risk, routine activity, but where bank margins are also low. The low risk stems 
from the fact that the usual collateral for trade finance is clear and tangible— the value of the 
cargo it finances.
3 But the low margin income for banks means that, because lenders tend to 
concentrate most funding on the most profitable segments of financial markets, in times of a 
tight liquidity squeeze, low value-added products such as short-term trade finance can be 
easily abandoned or reduced. Besides its low margins, trade finance’s preferential treatment 
had changed since the 1980s sovereign debt crisis, leading banks to consider trade finance 
as a less preferred source of profit. Previously, trade finance had preferential treatment in 
London Club debt restructurings; today, they are no longer distinguished from other loans by 
creditors, and are hence subject to the same restrictions in the case of risks.  
In the current global crisis, while only anecdotal evidence exists that point to difficulties in 
accessing finance, and, so far, there is no evidence that traders are unable to ship because 
of lack of trade financing, the cost of trade finance instruments has, nevertheless, tripled 
since last year. The increase in cost points to the same root causes as the lack of access.  
2.2  Banks’ Role in Trade Finance 
But what, exactly, are banks’ role in trade finance?
4 First, banks provide working capital to 
exporters, through short-term loans, credit lines or an overdraft facility, or advance payment 
of exporters’ bonds, or discounting of receivables. This pre- or post-shipment financing 
enables exporters to produce and ship products during the entire cash cycle. Banks in the 
exporting country can also extend buyer’s credit to a foreign buyer to finance the purchase of 
exports. Often, the availability of financing such as this can affect the relative 
competitiveness of the exporters and enable them to attract more contracts. 
Second, banks render services that facilitate the receipt or transfer of payment in a less 
costly and risky way (from simple intra-bank money transfers to relatively complex 
instruments such as leasing, letters of credit [L/Cs], and foreign exchange-related services). 
They can accept and confirm L/Cs as a counterparty of the importers’ bank, or be the issuing 
bank in the case of importers’ L/Cs. Third, banks can provide insurance against trade-related 
risks, through freight and export credit insurance or forward contracts.  
                                                  
3  There are different trade financing instruments that require different collateral. These are further discussed 
subsequently.  
4 This part draws from Finger and Schuknecht (1999). 
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Of course, there are also forms of trade financing that do not require the intermediary role of 
banks. The transaction can be done purely between the importer and exporter on a “cash-in-
advance” basis or on an “open account” basis (when shipment occurs before payment is 
due). The former is akin to a supplier credit while the latter is like a consumer credit. 
Companies can also directly issue Bills of Exchange or Promissory Notes
5. Some countries 
also make use of counter-trade or barter system by which they exchange goods at an 
agreed value without cash or credit terms. All these different forms of exchange have varying 
levels of risks and would not apply to all types of enterprise. For example, only financially 
stable exporters and those linked with vertical production networks and have long history of 
buyer-seller relationship can afford to export on an open account basis, while almost 90% of 
trade transactions are done via documentary credits.  
2.3  Finance and SMEs 
Banks, in both normal and crisis period, usually give priority to low-risk borrowers like large 
enterprises with profitable investments and sound collateral. SMEs are usually at the bottom 
of banks’ preferred customers, except when the government requires banks to provide loans 
to this group. Why are SMEs, generally, unable to obtain financing? For banks, SMEs, 
especially in developing economies, are always considered higher risk because of their 
opacity, and lack of collateral and audited financial statements. Sometimes, they have no 
good, profitable projects, no clear titles to real estate and other collateral, no clear 
managerial targets and succession plans, and no available credit history. SMEs hesitate to 
approach banks because of a cultural barrier, i.e., they do not want the strict monitoring by 
banks. At times, too, they may not have adequate information of all that banks can offer. 
This is particularly true of trade finance instruments. 
In the succeeding sections, this general interlinkage of bank liquidity problems, collateral 
issues, SME weaknesses, and trade financing will come into play as the effect of the crisis 
on SMEs is discussed.  
3.  IMPORTANCE OF SMES IN CENTRAL ASIAN ECONOMY 
To tackle the crisis effects on Central Asian SMEs, I first begin with a brief overview of the 
region’s economies. The section then proceeds with the discussion of SMEs’ importance in 
the economy, drawing from various previous studies, and extracts some noteworthy SME 
characteristics based on firm surveys.  
3.1  Brief Overview of Central Asia 
Central Asia was among the more underdeveloped regions in the world when the states 
comprising it became independent in 1991
6. Per capita incomes ranged from just over 50% 
of the Soviet Union average (Tajikistan) to about 90% (Kazakhstan). The region is rich with 
agricultural, mineral, and fuel resources, but because of its landlocked geography, many 
countries were heavily dependent on the Soviet system of trade routes and energy pipelines 
to reach world markets. Transport and trade infrastructure were outdated and, except for the 
Kyrgyz Republic, all countries in the region either have internal and regional conflicts or are 
near conflict zones. None had tasted modern statehood; rather their political institutions were 
legacies of the old communist system, with closed, autarkic, and heavily distorted industry 
and infrastructure serving mostly military purposes.  
                                                  
5 In both, a buyer undertakes to pay by a specified future date but the latter offers less legal protection. 
6 This part draws from International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1999). 
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After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, fast reformers (Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic) embarked on privatization of many state-owned enterprises (SOE), while 
gradualists (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) moved much more slowly. Tajikistan was in a 
state of civil war until 1995. SMEs surfaced during the post-break up period amidst a 
challenging macroeconomic environment marked by hyperinflation, financial system 
collapse, major structural adjustments, and an institutional vacuum. Some of the privatized 
SOEs became medium-sized or large enterprises, while all small firms and some medium-
sized enterprises were built up from scratch.  
Buoyed by a more favorable external environment and the high prices of its main export 
products (e.g. natural resources), Central Asia recovered from a decade of transition-related 
problems. Now, the most advanced economy of the group, Kazakhstan, has a gross national 
income (GNI) per capita of more than US$6,000, which is within the upper middle income 
bracket globally. The score remains below the average of that income group, but is close to 
other relatively developed economies like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Africa, Mexico, 
Malaysia, and Poland. The Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan remain in the low 
income group of countries globally, but have GNI per capita figures that are more than 20% 
higher than the group average. Turkmenistan is in the lower middle income group, like many 
Southeast Asian economies.
7  
Table 1 summarizes salient economic features of Central Asia. Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic fully embraced the market economy, evidenced in the large share of the private 
sector in its economies, starkly contrasting with Turkmenistan where the private sector 
remains insignificant
8. Poverty in Kazakhstan is well within advanced economy levels, but 
Uzbekistan’s poverty level is extremely high. Literacy rates, even after the deterioration of 
education levels due to civil strife, remain high throughout Central Asia, reaching almost the 
same level as in high-income economies. Mortality rates are worse than the upper middle 
income group average for Kazakhstan, but the mortality rates for the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan are significantly lower (better) than the low income country group average. 
Turkmenistan’s mortality rate is higher than the lower middle income country group average. 
As for infrastructure indicators, Kazakhstan is again above the average of the upper middle 
income group in the number of internet users per 100 people, as is the Kyrgyz Republic with 
respect to the low-income group. Uzbekistan, though, has an extremely poor internet access 
figure, with only 1.5 out of every 100 people using the internet. Mobile and fixed telephone 
subscribers are again high for the three low income Central Asian economies relative to their 
income group’s average, but Kazakhstan is slightly below the upper middle income group 
average.  Although Turkmenistan might have a higher GNI per capita than the three other 
Central Asian countries, its infrastructure and social indicators are significantly worse than 
the three low income Central Asian countries.
9 
 
7 The World Bank uses the following income classification of countries: Low income <US$935 GNI, 
Lower Middle Income US$936–US$3,705, Upper Middle Income US$3,706–US$11,455, and High 
Income >US$11,456. A caveat is in order for Turkmenistan’s GNI because statistics are considered 
state secrets in the country and the published GDP data are subject to wide margins of errors. 
8  In Turkmenistan, the private sector share is significant only in food processing and consumer trade and 
services. 
9 See Footnote 7 on Turkmenistan’s statistics. g Paper 187    Pasadilla 
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   Kazakhstan  Kyrgyz 
Republic  


















GNI per capita PPP (current US$)  6,134.8  695.8  701 1,373.7  701.2    37,571.6   574.4   1,905.0   7,107.0 
GNI per capita : group average 
a  0.86  1.21  1.22  0.72  1.22        
FDI Inflows per capita (current US$)  470  40  25  124  27        
FDI Inward Stock (% of GDP) 41.9  21.8  28.2  49.1  7.4        
Private Sector (share in GDP) - 2008 
70.0 75.0  55.0  25.0 45.0 
      
Poverty headcount at less than US$1.25 
a day (% of population) 
b 
3.1 21.8  21.5  — 46.3 
      
 Land area ('000 sq. km)   2,699.7   191.8  139.9  469.9    425.4           
Infrastructure Indicators 
       
      
Mobile and fixed-line telephone 
subscribers (per 100 people) 
100.5   50.6   39.9   16.2   28.7     150.4   25.5   54.1   106.7 
 Internet users (per 100 people)  12.3   14.3   7.2   1.4   4.5     65.7   5.2   12.4   26.6  
Social Indicators               
 Literacy rate, adult total (% of people 
ages 15 and above) 
99.6   99.3   99.6   99.5   —   99.0   63.5   82.6   94.1   
 Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live 
births) 
28.0   33.5   56.6   44.9   35.6     5.9   80.2   38.3   20.8  
 Population growth (annual %)  1.1   0.8   1.5   1.3   1.4     0.7   2.2   1.0   0.7 
Notes: 
a Kazakhstan- Upper Middle Income; Turkmenistan - Lower Middle Income; Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan - Low Income 
Table 1: Central Asia: Selected Indicators, 2007 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx 
b Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan- 2003; Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan – 2004 
PPP= purchasing power parity. GDP= gross domestic product.. 
ADBI Workin
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3.2  SMEs in Central Asia: Definition and Contribution in the 
Economy 
The definition of SMEs varies per country and even per sector but is, generally, based on the 
number of employees and capital thresholds. According to a United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) study
10, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Turkmenistan 
base SME definitions on maximum levels of capital, assets or income, and number of 
employees, while Tajikistan and Uzbekistan base the definition only on the number of 
employees. The threshold for the number of employees likewise varies per sector. For 
example, in Uzbekistan, to be considered “small”, the average number of employees should 
not exceed 40 in industry, 20 in construction, agriculture and other production spheres, 10 in 
retail trade and other nonproduction spheres. Other Central Asian countries likewise follow 
different thresholds for the maximum number of employees for different sectors of the 
economy. Of the five countries, only the Kyrgyz Republic provides a definition for medium-
sized enterprises, while the rest leave medium-sized enterprises undefined (see Table 2).
11  
 
                                                  
10 UNECE (2003a). 
11 Importantly, none of the official definitions of SMEs coincide with the classification that this paper uses in 
subsequent discussions. The paper follows other studies on SMEs that simply base firm classification on the 
number of employees or, if available, the amount of annual sales/turnover. Micro and small enterprises are 
those with less than 50 employees, medium with 50 to 249 employees, 250 and above are large firms. 
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Table 2: Definition of SMEs in Central Asia 
Country  Official Definition of SME 
Kazakhstan Small: 
Average annual number of employees not more than 50; 
Assets not exceeding 60,000 fold monthly estimated index (in 2002 the 
monthly estimated index equalled 823 tenge) 
 
Medium: No definition 
Kyrgyz Republic  Small: 
Production sphere: 
Number of employees up to 50; 
Net turnover up to Som500,000; 
 
Non-production sphere: 
Number of employees up to 15; 




Number of employees: 51–200; 
Net turnover: Som500,000–Som2,000,000; 
 
Non-production sphere: 
Number of employees: 16–50; 
Net turnover: Som500,000–Som2,000,000 
Tajikistan  Small enterprise: 
The average number of employees should not exceed 
- in industry and construction – more than 50  
- in other spheres of activities – 15 
 
Medium: No definition 
Turkmenistan  To be considered as a “small enterprise,” 80% of an enterprise’s income 




50 employees – for the enterprises that produce goods for 
industrial/technical consumption purposes, goods for public 
consumption and enterprises that carry out constructional and 
maintenance-constructional activities; 
10 employees – for the wholesale enterprises and those deriving 
revenues from intermediary and supplying activities; 
25 employees – for the enterprises with other types of activities 
 
Medium – No definition 
Uzbekistan  Micro enterprise: 
Average annual number of employees shall not exceed: 
10 – in industry; 
5 – in trade, services and other nonproduction spheres 
 
Small enterprise: 
Average annual number of employees shall not exceed: 
40 – in industry; 
20 – in construction; agriculture and 
other production spheres; 
10 – in retail trade and other nonproduction 
Spheres 
 
Medium – No definition  
Source: UNECE (2003a). 
Various studies on SMEs compiled by the World Bank/ International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) from different sources usually define an SME based on the number of employees. On 
this basis, the collected information shows that Uzbekistan has more than 200,000 micro- 
and small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), 86% of which are micro-sized 
7 ADBI Workin
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enterprises (see Table 3). The Kyrgyz Republic has more than 100,000 MSMEs largely 
comprised of both micro- and small-sized businesses. There are close to 30 MSMEs per 
1,000 people in the Kyrgyz Republic while the ratio is 14 and 10 MSMEs per 1,000 people 
for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, respectively.  
In terms of employment, MSMEs’ share of total employment range from 25% (for Tajikistan) 
to 60% (Turkmenistan). Uzbekistan and Tajikistan’s MSME share of employment is below 
the average of 58% for low income countries
12, while the Kyrgyz Republic and Turkmenistan 
is slightly over the average. The average SME employment share for upper middle income 
economies, where Kazakhstan belongs, is 40%— much higher than the 25% employment 
share in Kazakhstan.  
The importance of MSMEs in the economy is shown in the high contribution of MSME to 
total domestic production. In Uzbekistan, the MSME share of GDP is about one third, while it 
is more than 40% for Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyz Republic. The average GDP 
share of MSME for transition economies, based on data collected by UNECE
13, is around 




12 Based on the collected information from the IFC, I averaged all the collected share of MSME employment 
according to economic income category.  
13 UNECE (2003a). g Paper 187    Pasadilla 
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Table 3: Importance of SMEs 





MSME Definitions  
(number of employees) 
Structure of the MSME 
Sector 
(% of all MSMEs) 
MSME Participation in the 
Economy    












                                     
Kazakhstan
c 1994  UNECE  0-9 10-49  50-249  59.4 35.3  5.3 170,612  11.3  24.6 43.1 
Kyrgyz Republic 
e 2003  UNECE  0-9 10-49  50-249  99.4  0.6 142,475  28.3   59.0 
f 42.7 
Tajikistan
b 2002  IFC <50   51-200  99.8  0.2  92,964  14.3 25.0  — 
Uzbekistan
d 2003  IFC  <10  10-39  40-99  85.7  11.2  3.1  212,424  10.5  57.0 / 49.7 
f  31.0 
Turkmenistan                                60.0 
f  45.0 
c. No. of MSEs and MSE Participation taken from USAID SME Statistics (as of October 2005, divided by population and employment in 2005).   Share to GDP is for 2003. Number of 
operating MSMEs only, not total registered MSMEs 
d. IFC. Business Environment in Uzbekistan as seen by SMEs. 2003 (without individual entrepreneurs, employment share is 9%   and share in GDP is 15% (ADB, Private Sector 
Assessment for Uzbekistan. 2005). Active number only. 
b. Includes individual entrepreneurs and Dekhan farmers. Source: IFC. Business Environment in Tajikistan as seen by SME Businesses 2003 
Source: Kozak (2007), UNECE (2003a), UNECE (2006), IFC Business Environment Surveys, ADB.  
f. Employment share data (alternative figure) is from UNECE (2003a) 
a. UNECE (2003a).  
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More than one third of SMEs in Central Asia are engaged in trade. In the Kyrgyz Republic, 
services and  manufacturing likewise constitute a big portion of SME totals, while in 
Uzbekistan, SMEs in manufacturing constitute the majority. Tajikistan has most of their small 
enterprises engaged in agriculture, primarily related to cotton farming and related services 
(Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Structure of Incorporated SMEs by Sector (2001) 
  Distribution of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (%) 




35.8 21.1  9.3 28.2 5.6 
Tajikistan 38.4 15.0 12.1 11.0 23.5 
Uzbekistan 34.0  43.0  8.0  8.0  7.0 
Note: Other activities comprise of: agriculture; fishing; production and leading of electricity, gas and water; transport; 
public administration; institutions of education; exterritorial organizations; financial mediation; real estate transactions; 
healthcare; arrangement of recreation and entertainment facilities 
Source: UNECE (2003a). 
3.3  SME Characteristics: Ownership, Establishment, and Export 
Activities 
I use the 2005 BEEP Survey by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and World Bank to get a better look at SME characteristics in the region.
14 The 2005 
sample is comprised of 1,002 respondent firms from Central Asia, of which 690 are micro- 
and small-sized enterprises, 209 medium-sized firms (micro, small, and medium hereafter), 
and 103 large firms, using the number of employees as the basis for classification.
15 I find 
that among small firms, the number of those that are single proprietor (where a shareholder 
owns 100% of shares) ranges between 54% and 71%, while among large firms, the share of 
single-owned enterprises is much less.  
More than half of the firms in Central Asia have been private firms from the beginning. In 
Kazakhstan, the number of private start-ups was up to 75% while only 20% were established 
as privatized SOEs. Across all Central Asian countries, the number of private start ups 
exceeded the number of privatized SOEs which possibly implies a growing entrepreneurial 
class of citizens in these former communist countries. Among small firms, the majority were 
established as private start-ups. In Kazakhstan, for example, more than 80% of small firms 
started as a private enterprise right at the beginning. In the Kyrgyz Republic, the share is 
61% and in Uzbekistan 77%. In contrast, relatively more medium and large firms were 
established from the privatized state-owned enterprises, rather than as private start-ups 
(Figure 1).  
 
                                                  
14 The main BEEP Survey in 2005 is composed of 300 firms each from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 202 from 
Kyrgyz Republic, and 200 from Tajikistan. For both 1999 and 2005, the survey sample used stratified 
sampling, with various quotas on the basis of sector, size (based on number of employees), and location. For 
the 2005 survey, additional targets were included in the sample design, namely: at least 10% small enterprises 
(2-49 employees), and 10% large (250–9,999 employees); at least 10% of firms should be foreign controlled 
(more than 50% shareholding) and 10% under state control; at least 10% of firms export at least 20% of total 
sales; and at least 10% should be from a small city/countryside. Furthermore, the sectoral composition of the 
sample was determined according to the relative share in GDP. The sample excluded firms with only one 
employee, or those in sectors that are subject to government price regulation and prudential supervision like 
banking, or utilities (electric power, rail transport, water). See methodological notes on the BEEPS from the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development at www.ebrd.org. 
15 In subsequent discussion, the results do not materially change when I used both number of employees and 
amount of turnover/sales. So I opted for the more simple classification using employment. See Footnote 10. 
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% of firms that are originally private from start up
% of firms established through privatisation
% of firms owned 100% by the largest shareholder to total number of firms 
Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Tajikistan Kyrgyz Republic
                                                
 
How important are exports in SME activities? I grouped the firms in the BEEP Survey into 
those that export directly as well as those that export indirectly
16. The sample contains few 
firms, only 14% of the total, that directly or indirectly export (i.e., with positive export sales). 
But for these few firms, average direct and indirect exports constitute 45% and 28% of their 
total sale, respectively. Direct exports as a share of total revenue range from an average of 
27% for Kazakhstan to 62% for Tajikistan, while indirect export revenue is between 14% 
(Uzbekistan) and 45% (Kazakhstan).
 Only 10% of SMEs in the sample directly export,
17 yet 
in these firms, exports are a significant portion of their income. What is particularly striking is 
that, in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the share of export sales in small firms of 58% far 
exceeds the Central Asian sample average. In the Kyrgyz Republic, large firms’ exports 
dominate their total sale, while in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, large firms’ exports were 
roughly a third of sales (Table 5).  
Source: BEEPS (2005). 
 
16 Indirect export is when firms sell to a distributor or direct exporter.  










of direct exports 
to total sale (by 
exporting firms) 
  No. of Firms that 
Exported through 
a distributor 
Percentage share of 
indirect exports to total 
sale (only firms that 
exported through a 
distributor) 
Central Asia  1,002  136  45    21  28 
SME  899 93  45    15  27 
Large  103 43  42    6  6 
Kazakhstan 300  31  27   7  45 
SME 268  21  24    5  45 
Large 32  10  31    2  6 
Kyrgyz Republic - All  202  38  46    8  20 
SME 128  25  39    6  20 
Large 21  13  62    2  10 
Tajikistan - All  200  25  62    2  25 
SME 123  19  58    1  40 
Large 20  6  30    1  5 
Uzbekistan - All  300  42  49    4  14 
SME 219  28  58    3  8 
Large 30  14  47    1  3 
Table 5: SMEs and Export Activity 
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4.  EXPERIENCE OF SMES IN CRISIS 
Central Asia experienced its first post-independence economic crisis in 1998, which lasted 
up to 1999 following the Russian financial crisis. The channel through which contagion 
spread was through trade when Russia devalued its currency by 68% in 1998 and 326% in 
1999 relative to pre-crisis ruble to US dollar exchange rate levels. Russia and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were Central Asia’s main trading partner in the 
1990s. This devaluation led to a loss of export markets in Russia and globally, as well as 
import penetration by Russian products in Central Asia. The exchange rate devaluation and 
volatility was compounded by weak commodity prices and by the banking system disruptions 
related to the crisis.  
4.1  Effect of the Russian Financial Crisis in General 
The Russian ruble devaluation led to the relative appreciation of Central Asian currencies, 
causing their exports to slump in their major trading market. The hardest hit were the 
countries that had significant trade links with Russia and other members of the CIS, 
especially Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s GDP contracted by 2% in 1998, but also quickly 
recovered in 1999.  
Before the crisis, a significant share of Central Asian countries’ exports went to Russia and 
other CIS countries. Russia was a key export market for Uzbek cars and electronics, Kazakh 
chemicals, metals, food items, and light industry products. Both these countries exported 
more than a third of their total exports to Russia. Tajikistan exported (and still does) a huge 
number of laborers for Russian construction sector. Thus the ruble devaluation caused a 
significant rise in the region’s current account deficit as a percentage of GDP (Table 6). 
However, some countries like Kyrgyz Republic and Turkmenistan felt the export contraction 
not mainly through the depressed Russian market but, in the case of the former, more from 
the low prices and production problem in the mining sector, and in the case of the latter, from 
the suspension of gas exports to Ukraine
18.  
The imbalance in trade between Russia and Central Asia continued until the domestic 
currencies in Central Asia were allowed to float. Average depreciation in Central Asian 
currencies against the US dollar in 1998 and 1999 ranged from 147% in Kazakhstan to more 
than 1,500% in Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan’s currency appreciated vis-a-vis the ruble by 
39%, from a rate of 13.03 tenge to a ruble to 8.07, in 1998 and appreciated further to 4.85 in 
1999, or a whopping 63 % exchange rate adjustment since the beginning of the crisis. 
Except for Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan had the deepest rate of adjustment from the precrisis 
levels relative to other Central Asian countries. The Kyrgyz Republic had the least exchange 
rate adjustment by 1999, appreciating only by 47% from the 1997 level (Table 6). 
Aside from allowing their currencies to float, Central Asian economies also adopted various 
trade restrictions in a futile effort to initially maintain the peg to the ruble. Examples of these 
measures included: introduction of 20% value added tax (VAT) in Kazakhstan on all 
personal imports from Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyz Republic; imposition of import quotas 
after local producers complain about unfair competition from imports; new licensing 
procedures; etc. In Turkmenistan, the government required all export and import contracts to 
be approved by the State Commodity Exchange. In Uzbekistan, the government banned the 
free unlicensed sales of food, mostly imported from Russia. Except for the Kyrgyz Republic, 
none of the Central Asian countries was a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
at the time of the crisis, hence they were able to make discriminatory tariff changes against 
imports from specific countries, a violation of the most-favored nation principle which is 
                                                  
18 For this subsection, the paper draws from IMF (1999) which discussed in greater detail the Central Asian crisis 
following the Russian financial crisis.  
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sacrosanct to the WTO. On exchange flows, Uzbekistan increased the surrender 
requirement on exports, while Kazakhstan increased it on invisible transactions
19 and 
current transfers. Other Central Asian countries adopted other similar measures to favor 
domestic producers.  
                                                
Besides being hit by the ruble devaluation, Central Asia likewise suffered through the 
weakness in world commodity prices. At the time when oil prices were hitting a low of US$10 
per barrel, the heavily commodity export-dependent economies had little else to offset the 
adverse impact of the exchange rate volatilities. It was not until 1999 when the price of oil 
and metals increased that Central Asia was able to raise export levels and revenues.  
The decline in capital inflows due to the crisis and the disruption in banking activities raised 
foreign borrowing costs for all emerging markets. Kazakhstan, in particular, was severely 
affected as its banks intermediated huge flows of foreign capital and plowed them into the 
domestic economy, especially the mining sector. But as foreign investors became more 
circumspect about the former Soviet republics, the sources of capital dried up. Reportedly, 
international banks limited total loan exposures to these countries and made granting them 
more stringent. For example, the approval of any loans to Kazakh entities had to be obtained 
from the highest level of their headquarter offices
20.The Kyrgyz Republic, in turn, suffered 
from the drying up of liquidity when Russian and Kazakh bank subsidiaries operating in its 
domestic market limited funds and became extremely cautious.  
Compared to the first half of the 1990s, with three or four digit inflation in some Central Asian 
countries, inflation was not a significant concern during the Russian crisis, except for the 
Kyrgyz Republic which saw its inflation soar to 36.0% in 1999 from 10.5% in 1998. Relative 
to precrisis inflation, price changes seemed to have slowed, perhaps as a result of the 
significant appreciation of their currencies with respect to the ruble, increased control in the 
regulation of monopoly markets, changes in VAT rates, and cheap prices for raw materials 
(Kalyuzhnova and Vagliasindi 2006).  
 
19 This usually refer to services related transactions in a country’s current account. 
20 IMF (1999). 
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Table 6: Selected Crisis Indicators 
  1997 1998 1999    1997 1998  1999 
                       
  GDP Growth (%)    Unemployment (%) 
Kazakhstan 1.6  -1.9 2.7   13.0 13.1  13.5
Kyrgyz Republic  9.9  2.1 3.7   5.7 5.9  7.2
Tajikistan 1.7  5.3 3.7   2.6 3.2  2.2
Turkmenistan -11.3  6.7 16.5   1.9 2.0  2.1
Uzbekistan 2.5  4.3 4.3   0.3 0.4  0.4
         
  Inflation (% growth in CPI)   
Current Account Balance 
(% GDP) 
Kazakhstan 17.4  7.1 8.3 -3.5 -5.5  -0.2
Kyrgyz Republic  23.4  10.5 35.9 -7.8 -21.7  -14.5
Tajikistan 88.0  43.2 27.5 -4.0 -7.3  -0.9
Turkmenistan 83.7  16.8 24.2 -21.6 -32.7  -14.8
Uzbekistan 70.9  29.0 29.1 -4.0 -0.7  -1.0
        
 
Fiscal Deficit (% GDP, 
current prices)    Lending interest rate 
Kazakhstan -3.7  -3.9 -3.5 —  —    —
Kyrgyz Republic  -5.2  -3.0 -2.5 49.4 73.4  60.9
Tajikistan -4.1  -2.7 -2.4 75.5 50.9  26.2
Turkmenistan -0.2  -2.6 0.0 ——  —
Uzbekistan -2.4  -2.0 -1.7 ——  —
    
  Exchange rate (LCU/US$)  Exchange rate index 
     (LCU/Ruble, 1997=100) 
Kazakhstan 75.4  78.3 119.5 100 61.9  37.2
Kyrgyz Republic  17.4  20.8 39.0 100 71.3  52.7
Tajikistan  0.6 0.8 1.2 100 79.5 47.0
Turkmenistan 4,143.4  4,890.2 5,200.0 100 70.4 29.5
Uzbekistan 62.9  94.5 124.6 100 89.6  46.5
                       
Notes: CPI= Consumer Price Index; LCU= Local Currency Unit. 
Sources: Asian Development Bank (2008); IMF (2009) 
4.2  Effect on SME 
4.2.1  Capacity Utilization 
The Russian crisis had different effects on different sectors of the economy. For example, 
relative to other producers, import substituting sectors have felt the pinch harder due to the 
huge inflow of cheap Russian goods to Central Asia. Kalyuzhova and Vagliasindi (2006) 
validate this through a panel data econometric estimate of capacity utilization of firms in 
Kazakhstan. The argument is that when firms face reduction in demand, they run down 
inventory, thus leading to a lower level of utilized capacity.21 The authors show that import 
substituting sectors exhibit lower capacity utilization during the period of the Russian crisis 
                                                  
21 This actually depends on whether the reduction is temporary or permanent. The reduction in capacity utilization 
will ensue if reduction is permanent. However, because of demand uncertainty, firms can also cut capacity 
even if the demand reduction is temporary. 
15 ADBI Working Paper 187    Pasadilla 
 
relative to other sectors, implying that the sector was more heavily affected by increased 
competition from cheap Russian imports.  
One would have thought that many of the import substituting sectors must have been SMEs 
since the large enterprises in Kazakhstan are normally associated with the extractive sectors 
and export sector, and that, therefore, SMEs were those that should have suffered more 
severely from the Russian crisis. The authors, however, showed that this did not appear to 
have been the case. Their result, in fact, showed that, relative to other sectors, SMEs were 
less affected by the crisis evidence by their higher degree of capacity utilization. 22  
According to the authors, the higher capacity utilization, in turn, is due to the more flexible 
production structure of SMEs compared to large firms that are mostly SOEs or still partially 
owned by the government which has, therefore, “social obligations” towards the community 
and forced to retain employees as much as possible.  
4.2.2  Sales, Investments, Exports, Employment, Debt 
This apparently puzzling result appears to be also corroborated by the 1999 BEEPS. I 
consider only firms in the sample with annual sales not exceeding US$15 million which, as 
per definition used by the World Bank, is the limit for medium enterprises
23. I could not use 
the number of employees, as I did with the 2005 survey because the 1999 survey did not 
contain this information. As in 2005, the 1999 survey was conducted using a quota sample 
with targeted quotas on the basis of sector, size (based on number of employees), and 
location.  
One of the questions in the survey that can be interpreted as providing some assessment of 
the Russian crisis’ impact on SMEs asks whether the firm’s sales, investment, and 
employment have changed over the past three years.  As a result of the crisis, one would 
expect sales of SMEs to plummet and investment to take a back seat, but the result of the 
survey is, surprisingly, the reverse.  
The number of firms that reported an increase in sales and investments over the three 
preceding years exceeds those that report a decrease (Figure 2). Among exporters, the 
number of those that report an increase is roughly the same as those that experienced a 
decrease in exports. Only for “employment” did more firms report a decrease, while all the 
other variables appear to signify that firms were not that badly affected by the Russian crisis 
after all.  
Though the question in the survey relates to the three preceding years, the answers of the 
enterprises in 1999 are still telling of the relatively little impact of the Russian financial crisis 
on Central Asian SMEs. It is as if the SME responses were saying that relative to how they 
were during the earlier part of the decade with all the transition difficulties brought about by 
the break up of the Soviet Union, the financial crisis is almost like a ‘non-event’. If the crisis 
had been highly significant in reversing whatever gains they have had since earlier times, 
many enterprises would have reported ‘decreases’ in sales, investments, and exports over 
the past three years. But the survey result shows more number of SMEs reporting increases. 
For the lack of actual data of impact on SMEs, I take this evidence to mean that the result of 
the Russian crisis might not have been so dire, consistent with the same findings by 
Kalyuzhova and Vagliasindi (2006). On the other hand, that many firms report decrease in 
employment may be indicative of the restructuring programs of many privatized SOEs, 
whereby many superfluous laborers were removed. Is there a difference in the perception 
between exporting and non-exporting SMEs, and importing and non-importing ones? Further 
                                                  
22 SMEs in their study are enterprises with less than 500 employees. This definition is different from most studies 
e.g. by EBRD or World Bank, where SMEs are defined to be those with 250 employees and less (300 
employees for World Bank studies). 
23  In many studies, the World Bank uses the following definition for SMEs: medium – up to 300 full time 
employees and annual sales up to US$15 million; small – up to 50 employees and annual sales of up to US$3 
million; and micro—up to 10 employees and annual sales of up to US$100,000.  
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classification of the respondents did not exhibit any significant difference between exporters 
and non-exporters, nor between importers and non-importers. 







SALES INVESTMENT  EXPORTSEMPLOYMENT DEBT
Increase
Decrease
Q: Have your company's sales, investment, exports, employment, and
debt changed over the last 3 years?  The response is indicative of how 
firms saw the 1999 financial crisis relative to  transition difficulties during
earlier part of the decade 
 
Source: BEEPS (1999) 
4.2.3  Arrears 
Other corroborating evidence of the relatively little impact of the Russian crisis on SMEs is 
the number of firms in arrears on payments for taxes, utilities, salaries, and supplies. An 
overwhelming majority of respondents reported that they had no accounts payable in arrears 
(90-day overdue accounts) either to the government or suppliers or workers. Of the firms 
that had arrears, many more said that the amounts were modest than those that said 
substantial (see Figure 3). If there were significant amounts of arrears, they stemmed from 
late payments on accounts receivables, as customers were either unable to pay or 
requested to delay payments. Even then, most firms reported that the overdue accounts 
receivable amounts were modest. Since firms usually make use of liability payment arrears, 
especially tax arrears, as a cheap source of financing, this data indicates that, indeed, the 
SMEs did not appear to have been that badly scathed from the Russian crisis. 
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Local Taxes  Workers Customers
(1) Substantial amount (2) Manageable amount (3) Modest amount (4) Non-existent
Source: BEEPS (1999). 
4.2.4  Perception of Major Obstacles 
Comparing the firms’ perception of major obstacles in 1999 and 2005, the surveys show that 
the SMEs’ concern during the financial crisis was over the macroeconomy (see Figures 4a 
and 4b). The survey asked firms to rate specific factors from 1 (not an obstacle) to 4 (major 
obstacle). I took the number of firms that considered the different factors as major obstacle 
as a share of the total sample, shown in Figure 4. More than 50% of surveyed firms 
considered inflation and exchange rates as major obstacles to their business, while only 
46% indicated that financing was an obstacle. Other high-ranked factors are corruption, 
taxes, and policy/regulatory uncertainty. This result indicated how macroeconomic 
uncertainty posed a threat in the operations of many firms then and, by implication, financial 
crises exact real costs to the economy through the volatilities they create for firms. This 
concern over macroeconomy contrasts markedly with the result of the 2005 survey, taken at 
a time when the economy was generally stable. In 2005, macroeconomic considerations 
were not a major concern of firms. High taxes were a concern both in 1999 and 2005, but in 
the more stable period, it took a dominant place. Financing, too, was considered a major 
issue in both periods but, especially in the case of small firms, the cost of finance was a top 
concern in 2005. The other difference between the two surveys is that there was no single 
factor that was overwhelmingly considered as a major obstacle in the later survey. In 2005, 
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for example, the top “vote-getter” (taxes) concerned only 21% of the firms, while in 1999, 
macroeconomic factors received “votes” from more than half of the sample.  
The 1999 and 2005 BEEP Surveys were not conducted on the same set of firms to make a 
panel data. The BEEP Surveys included a panel component of 1,500 firms from the 2002 
and 2005 surveys, but not from the 1999 round. The change in perception between two 
groups of respondents, however, still reveals an overall shift of business sentiment even if 
the set of respondents may have been different, in relatively the same vein as how the 
random surveys that are usually carried out on various population groups are used to assess 
the public sentiment on any social or political issue. These random surveys of public 
perception are, likewise, not panel data, but rather to be considered a snapshot of the public 
pulse at different points in time. 











Notes: (a) Refers to practices by government or private enterprises; (b) Infrastructure refers to telephone, electricity, 
water, roads, and land. 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: BEEPS (2005). 
4.3  Effects on Trade Finance 
Some questions in the BEEP Survey focused on financing obstacles. Here, more than 50% 
of SMEs considered high interest cost as a major obstacle and this share was the same 
among different groups: exporters, non-exporters, importers, and non-importers. The next 
three major obstacles cited in 1999 - collateral requirements, access to long-term loans, 
bank bureaucracy—  were cited by a far lower percentage of firms that considered them as 
major obstacle (Figure 4). Interestingly, the ranking of these three factors permutes 
depending on whether the firms engaged directly in trade or not. In particular, for direct 
exporters and importers, collateral requirements came second, followed by access to long-
term finance, and bank bureaucracy, while for non-exporters and non-importers, access to 
long-term finance was second, then bank bureaucracy, and collateral requirements.  
Among the different formal financing arrangements that banks offer, trade finance is usually 
the least attractive to them, because it is typically a low-margin activity. However, it is also 
among the safest because they have clear, tangible collateral in the cargo that they fund. 
The 1999 BEEP Survey did not dwell in particular on trade finance, but  Figure 5, below, 
indicates it must have been likely that, along with other financing, the cost of trade finance 
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  Source: BEEPS (1999). 
4.3.1  Weak Financial System 
There are some factors that can explain the difficulty of access to finance, especially trade 
finance, of firms in Central Asia. One factor that the region shares with other transition and 
emerging economies is the weakness of the banking system. When the Russian financial 
crisis occurred, both Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic had just gone through a serious 
financial system crisis. The unstable financial position of the region’s commercial banks, 
which was further aggravated by the Russian crisis, made them high risk counterparties of 
western banks in any trade financing deal. Various reports during the period on conditions in 
the CIS, of which the Central Asian countries are members, indicate that prior to the 1998 
financial crisis, western banks were generally ready to confirm L/Cs issued by CIS banks. 
During the crisis, only very few banks remained willing to accept L/Cs issued by CIS 
banks.
24 It is likely the case that the same situation, if not worse, held true in Central Asia 
during the period. Since SMEs tend to get less favorable treatment from banks relative to 
large enterprises even during normal periods,
25 it can be surmised that during the Russian 
financial crisis, the financing situation for SMEs, could have only gotten worse.  
                                                  
24 Various issues of the EBRD Transition Report discussed some of the financing problems in CIS countries. A 
similar situation happened to Indonesia forcing the central bank to deposit part of their foreign currency 
reserves in foreign banks as guarantee or collateral for the L/Cs issued by Indonesian banks.  
25 This is due to various factors. SME creditworthiness is hard to evaluate, and in the region, many of them are 
new and have no credit history.  
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The weakness of the banking sector does not only affect trade finance through the lack of 
trust from foreign counterparties; it directly affects the domestic provision of trade and 
working capital financing services to local exporters and importers. During a financial crisis, 
banks’ weak condition makes them very selective in granting trade financing loans. In 
Central Asia, many local private banks issued L/Cs only to customers with the requisite 
funds on their account. This was almost equivalent to a cash collateral requirement by the 
issuing banks, making the financing operations of the firms more challenging.  
As the region is dependent on commodities exports, Central Asia’s trade financing needs are 
more for working capital and pre-shipment financing. Generally, without a working capital 
source, exporters have higher performance risk, i.e. the risk of not being able to deliver on 
time and according to desired quality. Hence, access to pre-shipment trade financing can 
help firms attract more international business. If exporters cannot deliver goods on time 
because of a lack of working capital, repeat business will be more difficult to obtain. But a 
weak banking system and a financial crisis make pre-shipment trade financing for working 
capital purposes more difficult and costly to obtain because the reluctance of banks to 
extend credit without burdensome collateral requirements is heightened during this period. 
4.3.2  Knowledge Deficit  
Besides the undercapitalization of Central Asian commercial banks, they also offer a  limited 
range of services and relatively inefficient loan monitoring capacity. Particularly in the 1990s, 
they lacked experience in documentary trade operations as well as knowledge in other trade 
financing instruments such as  forfaiting or factoring. Western banks often indicate that only 
a few banks in the region have sufficient know-how to act as an advising bank in an L/C 
transaction where a western bank acts as an opening (issuing) bank. In some cases, the 
region’s banks also have standards for trade finance operations that differ from international 
ones. Moreover, the document-processing technology is out-of-date (UNECE 2000).  
4.3.3  Risk Perception and Payment Method 
The other major factor is the perception of a high risk level in Central Asia that affects 
conditions of payment for trade transactions. For example, the French Export Credit Agency 
(COFACE) classified Central Asia as a high risk area and, thereby, advised exporters to the 
region to negotiate on pre-payment terms if possible. In contrast, other former Communist 
countries like Poland and Hungary had been able to negotiate on open account
26 and 
documentary credit terms. The high risk perception, along with the lack of know-how of 
banks in documentary credits transactions, could be the reasons for the predominant use of 
the prepayment method not only in import, but also export, transactions in Central Asia and 
many CIS economies. 
4.3.4  Trade Alternative 
In Central Asia, countertrade among traditional Soviet-era partners still exist and, in fact, 
helped in times of financing difficulties. When access to bank financing was difficult, 
countertrade among CIS countries played a major role in maintaining trade volumes and 
supply in individual regions. Even in some countries where cash withdrawals were strictly 
monitored and controlled, barter activities thrived for some basic materials and consumption 
goods. To a certain extent, it is alleged that barter trade may actually be less costly and 
more convenient than cash- or credit-based trade due to high taxes, insecure property rights, 
imperfect credit markets, and rent-seeking behavior of financial intermediaries (UNECE 
2000).  
                                                  
26 Open account is essentially like a trade credit given to importers by the exporter where payment may be 
delayed even as ownership of the exported goods had already been transferred to the importers. It takes an 
enormous deal of trust among parties for open account to be granted. This normally takes place, especially 
among vertically integrated firms or parent-subsidiary trade, where risk is extremely low and repeat business 
characterizes the relationship.  
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5.  EFFECT OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
5.1   Transmission Channels 
While the main channel for transmission of the Russian financial crisis to Central Asia was 
through trade links, the global crisis impacts the region directly through the financial illiquidity 
in the global markets. The most affected of the countries in the region is Kazakhstan which 
had fuelled its rapid growth through heavy private sector external borrowing from foreign 
capital markets. Kazakh banks balance sheets are estimated to have 50% in foreign 
liabilities
27 which, during the boom period, were plowed into the economy to finance major 
construction, real estate, and extractive industries. Similar to how it was in Asia (in 1990s) 
and in the US (recently), huge inflows of foreign finance fuelled a real estate bubble starting 
mid-2007. Now, when capital dried up from the global financial crisis, Kazakh banks are 
scrambling for new financing, both to finish off many real estate and construction activities as 
well as to pay off their maturing debts.  
The transmission channel of the global financial crisis to the rest of Central Asia is through 
Kazakhstan’s banking subsidiaries that operate in other Central Asian countries, particularly 
in the Kyrgyz Republic where nearly half of the banking system is owned by Kazakhstan 
banks. As the Russian and Kazakh parent banks of these subsidiaries struggled, the 
subsidiaries also wobbled through lack of funding, creating financial strain in other parts of 
the region. Thus, even countries that were not linked to the foreign financial market were 
caught up in the mayhem in the global markets through the troubles of the foreign-owned 
subsidiaries. Already, the Kyrgyz Republic had experienced a credit slowdown as a result of 
the banking sector difficulties in Kazakhstan.  
In Kazakhstan, around 70% of bank loans are connected directly and indirectly with real 
estate. These loans, in turn, were funded not from domestic deposits but from foreign debt 
which now amount to 4.8 trillion tenge (approximately US$39 billion.)
28 Now shut off from 
international capital markets, and facing difficulties in rolling over their external debt, Kazakh 
banks with high exposure to international capital markets are the most badly hit. Further, 
Kazakh banks’ exposure to the declining Russian real estate market, along with the 
weakness of the Russian ruble make them susceptible to further balance sheet pressure. 
The increase in provisioning for the potential losses from real estate and nonperforming 
loans, as well as for the maturing foreign debt has created illiquidity in the lending market 
and tightening of lending requirements.  
The other channel of contagion is the drop in remittances of migrant workers, mostly from 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic, working in Kazakhstan and Russia. As the economic growth 
in these two countries stumbles, migrant workers that benefited from the construction boom 
find themselves out of work and had to return home, thus contributing to the rise in domestic 
unemployment. In countries that have become heavily dependent on foreign remittances—
Tajikistan, for example, received remittances equivalent of 50% of its 2008 GDP (IMF 
2009)—the drop in this foreign financial flow is equivalent to a major external shock. The 
projected 30% decline in remittances in Tajikistan threatens to affect poor and vulnerable 
households. It will likewise have an adverse impact on the profitability of Tajik banks 
because of the drop in associated fees from remittances. Bank fees from remittances 
constitute about one third of Tajik bank income.  
Although commodity prices have not reached the nadir it did in the 1990s, the weakness in 
commodity prices is additionally impinging on the commodity export dependent economies 
of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). The lower export revenues 
lessen the emergency fund that they can use to boost domestic demand in the face of a 
                                                  
27 IMF (2009b). 
28 Using 122.40 tenge: 1 US$  average exchange rate in 2008. 
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sluggish global market. On top of the terms of trade deterioration, weak global demand, for 
cotton, aluminum, and other metals (except gold), is further exacerbating growth declines in 
these countries, including Tajikistan.  
5.2   Macroeconomic Effects 
Macroeconomic effects, so far, have been seen mainly in Kazakhstan, the most globally 
linked of the Central Asian countries. In 2008, Kazakhstan grew by 3.2%, a decrease of 
more than five percentage points from its 2007 growth rate. For the rest of the Central Asian 
countries, the 2008 growth rate shed between 0.5 to 2.0 percentage points from their 2007 
growth rate. In 2009, the prediction was more dire with a negative growth rate projected for 
Kazakhstan and very low growth expected for Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are expected to achieve real gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth of 7% because of favorable developments in the hydrocarbon sectors. Exchange rate 
depreciation, caused by asset switching in favor of safer foreign currencies, and higher food 
and fuel prices are expected to contribute to higher inflation. The external dimension of the 
crisis and weak global demand is reflected in current account projections that shift from 
surplus in 2008 to a small deficit in 2009. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that 
while the energy exporters from Central Asia would see their current account surpluses 
evaporate due to falling commodity prices, the energy importing countries would narrow their 
current account deficit because of tightening financing conditions. Similarly, the fiscal 
position is moving from a surplus into a deficit. 
Table 7: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators (2007–2009) 
  2007 2008  2009    2007 2008  2009 
                       
  GDP Growth (in %)    Inflation (growth in CPI in %) 
Kazakhstan 8.9  3.2 -2.0  10.8 17.2  9.5
Kyrgyz Republic  8.5  7.6 0.9  10.2 24.5  12.4
Tajikistan 7.8  7.9 2.0  13.2 20.4  11.9
Turkmenistan 11.6  9.8 6.9  6.3 15.0  10.0
Uzbekistan 9.5  9.0 7.0  12.3 12.7  12.5
          
  Exchange rate (LCU/US$)
 a  Exchange rate index 
     (LCU/Ruble, 2007=100) 
Kazakhstan 122.6  118.3 140.2 100 99.2 87.2
Kyrgyz Republic  37.3  36.5 41.7 100 100.9  85.1
Tajikistan 3.4  3.4 3.8 100 101.0 84.9
Turkmenistan —  5,200.2 5200.2 100 102.8 76.0
Uzbekistan —  1,314.5 1419.2 100 101.1 80.4
    
 
Current Account Balance (% 
GDP)  
Fiscal Deficit (% GDP, current 
prices) 
Kazakhstan -7.8 5.3 -6.4 — — —
Kyrgyz Republic  -0.2  -6.5 -6.3 0.1 — —
Tajikistan -11.2  -8.8 -9.7 1.7 — —
Turkmenistan 15.4  19.6 15.7 — — —
Uzbekistan 7.3  13.6 7.7 ——  —
Note: 
a only first quarter 2009.  
Shaded cells are projections by the IMF; CPI = Consumer Price Index; LCU= Local Currency Unit. 
Sources: ADB 2008; IMF 2009a. 
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5.3  Effects on Trade Finance and SMEs 
As the banking sector becomes illiquid, the story unravelling now looks similar to the 
previous Russian financial crisis. The financial market is characterized by deleveraging 
commercial banks, a sharp rise in risk aversion, and increasing numbers of bank failures. 
Trade finance is again among the financing facilities that show signs of tightening. An IMF 
survey
29 of banks showed that prices of lending facilities, including L/Cs, have risen, partly 
due to higher cost of funds and partly due to higher capital requirements and rising default 
risks. Banks, moreover, see the price trend continuing in 2009. The volume of trade 
transactions from emerging market banks had declined by an average of 6%. Emerging 
markets are most affected by the rising costs and increased risk perception because the 
products they ship tend to be low-margin products, usually as part of the global value-added 
supply chains. The increase in trade financing cost eats up a huge portion of their narrow 
margin. The survey also reported that banks had tightened guidelines for some specific 
countries.  
5.3.1  Funding Sources of SMEs 
While there is scant data on the effect of the global crisis on SMEs in Central Asia, I try to 
assess the potential effects using the SME characteristics I obtained from the 2005 BEEP 
Survey.
30 The idea is to uncover some financing structure from this survey and derive 
relevant implications that can apply to the current crisis. The survey was again conducted 
using stratified sampling similar to the approach taken for the 1999 BEEP Survey.  
Figure 6 shows the financing sources for working capital of enterprises in Central Asia. All 
firms show that the majority of the working capital requirements were sourced internally, 
while the remaining 12 to 20% were externally funded. Of the external sources, all firms 
relied heavily on bank borrowings, both from the government and private sector, as well as 
trade credits. Small enterprises, however, relied relatively less on government banks loans 
compared with medium enterprises. Moreover, SMEs had a heavier reliance on family loans 
which large enterprises did not. On the other hand, large enterprises relied more heavily on 
foreign bank borrowings than SMEs. 
From this basic analysis, the implication is that while both SMEs and large  firms would be 
affected by the global financial crisis through the impact on the liquidity of the banking 
system, large enterprises would likely be harder hit than SMEs because of their heavier 
reliance on foreign financing, as foreign investors and lenders are now more highly risk 
averse due to problems in the foreign capital markets.  
                                                  
29 See Dorsey (2009).  
30 The sample is comprised of 300 firms each for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 202 for Kyrgyz Republic, and 200 
for Tajikistan. Sectoral composition is as follows: 26% wholesale, retail, and repairs; 21% manufacturing; 12% 
construction; 9% real estate, rentals and business services; 6% transport, storage and communication; 4% 
hotels and restaurants; 2% mining and quarrying; and 4% other sectors. 
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All Firms Small Medium Large All Firms Small Medium Large
Bank Borrowing Trade Credits from suppliers Loans from family Govt bank borrowing Trade Credits fromconsumers Foreign borrowing Informal sources
 
Note: The share of total working capital financing corresponds only to external sources and excludes retained 
earnings, hence, sum does not add up to 100%. See footnote 12 for definition of small, medium, large. 
Source: BEEPS (2005). 
To further analyze the differential impact of the crisis on various enterprises, I divided the 
groups into SME exporters and non-exporters, as well as large exporters and non-exporters. 
Exporters are those firms with more than 20% of their sales accounted for by direct 
exports.
31  Figure 7 shows that large exporters relied relatively more on private and 
government bank borrowings than SMEs. Further large exporters relied more heavily on 
foreign bank borrowing compared with large non-exporters. SME exporters, on the other 
hand, relied more on other sources of finance, like state-owned banks, family loans, supplier 
and consumer credits, leasing, and loans from informal sources than large exporters.  
Large exporters stand to suffer from illiquidity in the global financial markets more than non-
exporters because of their heavy reliance on foreign borrowing. Large exporters source 
                                                  
31 The choice of 20% is arbitrary. The EBRD and World Bank used the 20% cut off for direct exports as a basis 
for the stratified sampling targets, hence I considered it, likewise, as a realistic benchmark for categorizing 
“exporters” from “non-exporters”.  
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almost 7% of their working capital requirements from foreign borrowing compared with less 
than 1% for large non-exporters. 
Since retained earnings is a large source of working capital, the global financial crisis affects 
all enterprises’ financing source through its effect on economic growth and sales. If sales 
drop, earnings will also drop, thus affecting a huge source of working capital for all 
enterprises. For exporters, a drop in foreign sales may be offset by the depreciation of the 
local currencies which increases the amount of their total revenues (in local currencies). 
Exporters also benefit from a more diversified market, as even if some foreign markets 
experience demand weakness others may compensate, compared with non-exporters that 
are limited to the domestic market alone. Large exporters may benefit from the rise of 
commodity prices because most large exporters are in the extractive industries, while SME 
exporters, which are usually in manufacturing and the retail/wholesale trade business, may 
be more direly affected by the weakness in domestic and foreign demand. 


















































































5.3.2  Nonbank Funding Sources 
Firms usually use sources of finance other than the banking sector through the mode of 
payment to suppliers or from customers. In particular, advance payment by customers is a 
form of cheap credit for the producers and is a help in lessening working capital pressure. 
Similarly, delayed payment to suppliers is another form of credit.  In this sense, how much 
advance payment the producers can source from customers, or how much delayed payment 
it can negotiate with suppliers may provide some implications on pressures that the global 
financial crisis can impose on firms.  
Figure 8 indicates the relative share of advance payment, cash payment, and suppliers 
credit in the previous years input purchases of the respondents. It reveals that whether they 
are SMEs or large firms, enterprises in Central Asia have to transact either in cash for input 
purchases or provide advance payment. Supplier credits were as little as 10% of total 
purchases of SMEs (15% for large firms), while advance payment is close to 50% of input 
purchases for large firms. More than 50% of SME purchases were paid in cash. For SME 
importers, the advance payment requirement is even higher than the SME average. 
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SME importers SME non importers Large importers Large non importers SMEs Large
advance payment to suppliers Cash on delivery purchased on credit
 
Source: BEEPS (2005). 
The relative importance of prepayments and cash payments as a share of purchases implies 
that all enterprises would need larger working capital finance or bridge financing to be able 
to pay for the inputs they need for production. Either this, or input suppliers would be forced 
to grant more supplier credits to continue operations. However, considering the high risk 
associated with sales to Central Asian importers, an increase in suppliers credits from 
foreign suppliers may be difficult to negotiate given the current global economic situation. 
For SME importers, the need for advance payment may be attenuated by the existence of 
trade guarantees, either from the government or from international donor agencies. 
The situation is relatively less stark if we look at the mode of payment by consumers (Figure 
9). In this case, SMEs’ financing need is decreased by the fact that a large share of their 
sales are paid in advance or upon delivery. This is particularly true for SME exporters, 
despite performance or delivery risk concerns for exporters from emerging markets 
generally. SME exporters get 55% of their sales paid in advance compared with 29% for 
non-exporting SMEs. Large firms have similar payment structures regardless of whether 
they export or not— receiving roughly 40% of sales through advance payments. 
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SME exporters SME non exporters Large exporters Large non exporters SMEs Large
advance payment from customers Cash on delivery sold on credit
 
Source:  BEEPS (2005). 
The potential risk from the global financial crisis, given this payment structure on sales, is 
that the depressed global demand might reduce the capacity of foreign buyers to make 
advance payments leading them to demand more credits from exporters from Central Asia. 
Unlike the manufacturing trade, where alternative financing may be arranged between 
companies because of the vertical relationships of the exporter and importer,
32 trade in 
commodities tends to be more volatile and usually goes through organized commidities 
exchange markets and is, thus, highly dependent on bank-based financing.  In turn, the 
inability of firms engaged in commodities trade to collect payments and obtain financing may 
have significantly contributed to their default on their own bank loans.   
6.  GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR SMES 
Central Asian governments recognize the importance of SME development in their countries’ 
growth. But SMEs have yet to emerge as the real backbone of the Central Asian economies 
because large enterprises have historically dominated major industries like metal, oil, and 
gas. To assist SME growth, the countries have special programs funded by the government 
or foreign donor institutions. In Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, for example, there are 
support infrastructures (business incubators, techno-parks), consulting and training centers, 
special tax regimes, outright financial support through loans and grants. Tajikistan is 
streamlining their SME policies to eliminate program duplication, and developing state policy 
and strategies to attract FDI to SMEs. Even Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which are the 
least market oriented in the region, have special financial and tax privileges in their laws for 
SMEs
33.  
In the current global financial crisis, Kazakhstan’s government has set aside US$4 billion 
emergency spending or approximately 20% of its GDP, out of which 117 billion tenge
34 (or 
                                                  
32 For example, partner foreign firm can make advance payments to facilitate production of local firms. 
33 See UNECE (2003a). It provides an excellent survey of SME policies in transition economies. 
34 Approximately, US$956 million using exchange rate of 122.379 tenge to one US$. 
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roughly 25% of emergency spending) are allocated for SMEs. The government-owned 
holding company Samruk-Kazyna is managing the fund and agreed with 12 commercial 
banks to disburse money in February 2009 to finance SME purchases of fixed assets, 
operating costs, and refinancing of existing loans. The loans are capped at 750 million tenge 
(US$5 million) per borrower and with a seven year tenor. The government has also lowered 
corporate tax rates and removed the monthly tax pre-payment to help business enterprises.  
In terms of trade finance, transition economies have varying degrees of SME support 
through direct export financing and export credit insurance. Government-sponsored direct 
export finance can take the form of pre-production financing of the domestic exporter, 
refinancing of export credits extended by commercial banks, or interest rate subsidies. 
Government-owned export credit agencies usually provide trade insurance to cover various 
trade risks (commercial, political, etc.) of non-payment as well as guarantees for trade 
transactions. These guarantees are often crucial for actual access to bank finance. 
Unfortunately, these types of support are not as well developed in Central Asia as in other 
transition countries. For example, in the UNECE (2000) Conference volume, only 
Kazakhstan was mentioned to have a government agency providing exporters with direct 
financing. Likewise, only Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have government-supported export 
credit and insurance schemes that seem operational. The Uzbek Export-Import Insurance 
Company appears to be the best capitalized and the most active export credit agency in the 
CIS region.  
Interestingly, what the SMEs are clamoring for from the government, over and above 
technical and financial support such as  those mentioned above, are, actually, basic market 
reforms in the form of transparent and consistent regulations and tax policies, less 
corruption, lower cost of finance, as well as better infrastructure.  
6.1  Market Reforms 
In countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, a market economy has never been fully 
embraced, and the global financial crisis had just reinforced their resistance to move towards 
greater market reform. Although these slow reform economies have legally promulgated 
measures to develop the private sector, they neither constitute a coherent strategy or vision 
for the role of the private sector in the economy nor are they fully implemented.  In 
Uzbekistan, for example, government control remains pervasive through its direct and 
indirect control of state-owned joint stock companies or enterprises managed through 
industrial associations. Through government procurement, the state has control over 
important food and cash crops. For example, cotton production is controlled through a 
central government scheme, limiting options of farmers to plant alternative crops. The 
government industrial policy and involvement in the economy undermines the creation of a 
dynamic private sector and fair competition culture and throttles the growth of SMEs.  
In Central Asia, property rights, ownership of land, and land markets are among the basic 
reform that could support SMEs. Thus far, only Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic have 
managed to amend their constitutions to allow private land ownership. Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan still have limited land tradability either de jure or de facto 
(Tajikistan) (see Table 8). In Uzbekistan, for example, the state grants farmers only a time-
bound right to use land, not full property rights. It also heavily regulates the scale and type of 
activities, including controlling the amount of land devoted to particular crops. The lack of 
clear property rights and tradable rights in land hamper agriculture in which many individual 
entrepreneurs depend and severely hamper their access to finance. It undermines efficiency 
and discourages investments. Removing this constraint would provide a big spur for 
agricultural growth and productivity.
35 
                                                  
35 In Tajikistan, the constitution still holds that the property rights to land belong to the state only. 
Therefore legal entities and individuals cannot own and sell the land. Land legislation allows land use 
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Other areas of market reform that support SMEs are in the area of institutional quality, i.e. 
the quality of the regulatory framework as well as the institutions that implement them.  For 
example, addressing tax policy through a simplification of customs and tax rules and 
procedures and removing bureaucratic red tape, can eliminate one of the most serious 
constraints to business. It is, besides, a frequent source of corruption. Reform could help 
many SMEs that operate in the informal economy, seeking to avoid legal taxes yet also 
paying a high cost for avoiding the law in the form of unofficial payments to corrupt law 
enforcers, to emerge from the gray sector.  
Central Asian countries have made significant progress in establishing a legal and regulatory 
framework for businesses, although better enforcement is needed. The corpus of 
commercial laws, e.g. transactions law or  insolvency law, are generally limited in scope and 
thus are assessed as ranging from low quality (for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) 
to medium quality (Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan) (see Table 8).  
All the regulatory framework, no matter how well crafted, will be for naught without a 
comprehensive legal and judicial reform. An improved judiciary is critical to ensure the 
effective enforcement of constitutional rights and freedoms, to curb the arbitrary and 
predatory behavior of public administration and law enforcement agencies, to ensure better 
protection of property rights and contract enforcement.  
 
 
rights but does not envisage alienation (i.e. ownership or subsequent sale and resale). There is also 
no normative legal base duly regulating the issues of land mortgage.  
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Table 8:  Indicators of Market Economy Reform 
 




































Kazakhstan full  except 
foreigners 












Tajikistan limited  de 
facto 
yes  very low  inefficient  very low  2.33 4.00 1.67 49 27.6 
Turkmenistan limited  de 
jure 
no   low  malfunctioning  low  1.00 2.33 1.00 — —. 
Source: EBRD database. http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm; http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings/?excel=true 
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6.2  SME Perceptions of Various Obstacles to Growth 
  I also used the 2005 BEEP Survey, once again, to assess the perception of business 
environment at the micro level. From this survey, I derive some implications of worthwhile 
government programs and support for SMEs. 
Figure 10 provides a picture of what concerned firms, including SMEs, the most. The survey 
asked how problematic the different factors were for the growth and operation of the 
enterprise with options from 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (major obstacle). The graph shows the 
percentage of firms in Central Asia that consider the different factors as a major obstacle to 
their growth (i.e. rated them as 4). Among small firms, the cost of finance was chosen by 
most, followed by tax administration and corruption. Access to finance is somewhere in the 
middle of all the factors identified. For all firms, tax administration appears to have posed a 
greater concern than the cost of finance. 

























Source: BEEPS (2005). 
Various other reports add further qualitative assessments to the survey results. For example, 
a United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) study
36 stated that in 
some Central Asian countries, firms cannot deduct some production expenses, e.g. credit for 
value added tax (VAT) on capital imports, including plant, machinery or building, from their 
taxable amount, even though it is the international accounting practice. This puts firms 
operating in these economies at a competitive disadvantage because they have to pay 
higher taxes. Other complaints are about the low state of executive discipline and the large 
number of inspectors that hinder entrepreneurial activities, the high level of corruption and 
growth of the shadow economy, time-consuming and bureaucratic licensing procedures, 
poor information dissemination for SMEs, or frequent changes of legislation. In 
Turkmenistan, the complaints center on the lack of commitment towards entrepreneurial 
                                                  
36 UNECE (2003a). 
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activities. Government reforms of these basic regulatory issues would go a long way to 
facilitate growth of entrepreneurship.  
6.2.1  Perceptions of Obstacles by Size of Firm 
Are different sized firms affected differently? Are their perceptions significantly different from 
each other? To answer whether firms of different size differ in their perceptions of obstacles, 
I divided the respondent into SME (below 250 employees) versus large firms (more than 250 
employees). I computed the respective rating averages from each group for each factor, 
then tested for significance of the mean difference. The result is reported in Table 9a. I also 
divided the firms into micro and small firms (below 50 employees) vis-à-vis medium and 
large (more than 50 employees). The latter result is in Table 9b.  
The result in Table 9a shows that for Central Asia as a whole, there is no difference in the 
perceived problem of the cost of finance across firm size, but in terms of access, SMEs find 
it relatively more problematic than large firms. However, when it comes to customs and trade 
regulations, large enterprises find it more a problem than SMEs do.  The highest rating for 
both SMEs and large enterprises are the tax rates and tax administration.  
In the Kyrgyz Republic, SMEs find electricity a greater concern than large enterprises do, but 
the reverse takes place for customs and trade regulations, labor regulations, and quality of 
labor. In Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, the perceptions of all firms of the various 
obstacles to growth are not significantly different from each other, except for customs and 
trade regulation (Kazakhstan: with large firms showing a greater emphasis), street crime 
(Uzbekistan: SME firms reported higher scores ), and corruption (Tajikistan: SME emphasis 
was greater).  
Table 9b shows a slightly different result. For Central Asia, the two groups’ average 
perception of the obstacles diverged for electricity, customs and trade regulations, tax 
administration, labor regulations, and skills and available workforce. They did not, however, 
vary significantly in their perception of financing. In the individual countries, too, there were 
more significant divergences than in the previous table. For example, in Kazakhstan, small 
firms found access to finance, cost of finance, electricity, and transport, more of a concern 
than did medium and large enterprises, while the latter found customs and trade regulations 
more problematic than other types of firms.  
One possible explanation for these two different results is that medium and large firms are 
not too dissimilar in their perception of obstacles and constraints to growth. Hence, when 
medium firms were put along the same group as micro and small enterprises, the group 
average of SMEs moved closer to that of large enterprises. But when medium firms were 
removed from the group, the constraints cited by micro and small enterprises came to the 
fore in a more obvious manner. This finding could be useful in designing policies for SMEs 
as a group.  
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Table 9a:  Perceptions of Obstacles, by Size of Firm 2005  















































Finance                         
 Access to Finance  2.0  1.8  *  2.0 1.8  - 2.0  1.8  - 1.9 1.7  -  2.1  2 - 
 Cost of Finance  2.3  2.2  -  2.4  2.2  -  2.0  2.1 -  2  2 -  2.6  2.5  - 
Infrastructure                            
 Telecommunications  1.3  1.2  -  1.3  1.2 -  1.3  1.3  -  1.5 1.4 -  1.2  1.1  - 
 Electricity  1.6  1.4  -  1.4  1.3  -  1.6  1.7 -  2  1.8 -  1.5  1.1  * 
 Transport  1.4  1.4  -  1.4  1.3  -  1.4 1.7  -  1.5  1.6 -  1.4  1.2   
 Access to Land  1.6  1.5  -  1.7  1.5  - 1.3  1.2  - 1.7  1.6 -  1.7  1.5   
Business Regulation                          
 Title or leasing of land  1.6  1.5  -  1.7 1.5  - 1.4  1.4  - 1.7 1.6  -  1.7  1.3   
 Customs and trade regulations  1.8  2.1  *  1.8 1.9  *  1.8 1.9  -  1.8  1.8 -  1.8  2.6  * 
 Business licensing and permits  2.0  1.9  - 1.9 1.9  - 1.9  1.7  - 2.2  2  -  1.9  2.2   
 Regualtory policy uncertainty  2.1  2.1  - 2.0 1.9  - 2.1  2.0  - 1.9 1.6  -  2.9  3.3   
Taxation                          
 Tax rates  2.5  2.3  -  2.4  2.0  -  2.4 2.4  -  2.6  2.3 -  2.8  2.5  - 
 Tax administration  2.5  2.4  -  2.3  2.1 -  2.3  2.4  -  2.6 2.3 -  2.9  2.7  - 
Labor                          
 Labor regulations  1.4  1.5  -  1.4  1.4 -  1.3  1.5  -  1.4 1.3  -  1.5  1.9 * 
 Skills and available workforce  1.8  1.9  - 1.9 2.0  - 1.5  1.4  - 1.7  1.6  -  2  2.8  * 
Macroeconomic Instability 
(inflation, exchange rate)  2.1 2.2  -  2.1  2.0  -  2.1 2.0 -  2.1  1.8 -  2.6  3  - 
Institution's property rights                          
 Judiciary  1.8  1.7  -  1.8  1.7  -  1.6  1.4 -  1.8  1.5 - 2  2.2  - 
 Corruption  2.0  1.9  -  1.9  1.8 -  1.6  1.4  -  2.1 1.4  *  2.7 2.8  - 
 Street crime  1.7  1.7 -  1.8  1.6  -  1.6  1.2 *  1.6 1.4  -  2.2  2.4 - 
 Organized crime  1.5  1.6  -  1.5  1.4  -  1.4  1.2 -  1.6  1.4 -  1.7  2.1  - 
Note: * signifies statistical difference between the two group means at 95% confidence level. 
Source: BEEPS (2005) and author's computations. 
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Table 10:  Perception of Obstacles, by Size of Firm  






























































Finance                                   
 Access to Finance  2.0  1.9  -  2.1  1.7  *  1.9 2.1  -  1.9 1.9 -  2.1  2.1  - 
 Cost of Finance  2.3  2.2  -  2.5  2.2  *  2.0 2.2  -  1.9  2  -  2.7  2.4  - 
Infrastructure         1.4                           
 
Telecommunications  1.3 1.3  -  1.4  1.1  *  1.3 1.3  -  1.5 1.4 -  1.2  1.2  - 
 Electricity  1.6  1.5  *  1.4 1.2  *  1.6 1.7  -  2.1 1.8 -  1.5  1.4  - 
 Transport  1.4  1.5  -  1.4 1.3  -  1.4 1.6  *  1.4 1.6  -  1.3  1.4  - 
 Access to Land  1.6  1.5  -  1.8  1.4  - 1.3  1.3  - 1.8  1.6  - 1.7  1.7  - 
Business 
Regulation                                    
 Title or leasing of 
land  1.6 1.5  -  1.8  1.5  -  1.4 1.4 -  1.7  1.7 -  1.7  1.5  - 
 Customs and trade 
regulations  1.7 2 *  1.7 1.9  *  1.8 2  -  1.8  1.8  -  1.7  2.3 * 
 Business licensing 
and permits  1.9 2  -  1.9  1.9  -  1.9 2  - 2.1  2.2  - 1.9  2.1  - 
 Regulatory policy 
uncertainty  2.2 2.3  -  2.0  1.9  -  2.1 2.1 -  1.9  1.9 -  2.8  3.1  * 
Taxation                                    
 Tax rates  2.5  2.6  - 2.4  2.3  - 2.4  2.7  *  2.5 2.6  -  2.8  2.8  - 
 Tax administration  2.4  2.6  *  2.3 2.3  -  2.2 2.6  *  2.5 2.6  -  2.9  2.9  - 
Labour                                    
 Labor regulations  1.3  1.6  *  1.4 1.5  -  1.3 1.6  *  1.3 1.5  *  1.4 1.7  * 
 Skills and available 




exchange rate)  2.2 2.2  -  2.1  1.8  -  2.0 2.2 -  2.0  2.1 -  2.6  2.8  - 
Institution's 
property rights                                    
36 g Paper 187    Pasadilla 
37 






























































 Judiciary  1.8  1.8  -  1.8  1.8  -  1.6 1.5  -  1.7 1.9 -  1.9  2.1  - 
 Corruption  2.0  2.0  -  2.0  1.9  - 1.6  1.6  - 1.9  2  - 2.7  2.7  - 
 Street crime  1.8  1.8 -  1.8  1.7 -  1.7  1.3 *  1.5 1.7  -  2.1  2.4  - 
 Organized crime  1.5  1.6  -  1.5  1.5  - 1.4  1.2  - 1.5  1.6  - 1.6  1.9  - 
Note: * signifies statistical difference between the two group means at 95% confidence level 




 ADBI Working Paper 187    Pasadilla 
 
6.3  Cost and Access to Finance 
Since the financing problem figures prominently among the major concerns of all firms, I take 
a closer examination of this factor by dividing the survey response by firm size. Figure 11 
shows the percentage of firms which indicated that cost and access to finance were major 
obstacles, by size of firms and by country. The result shows that in Kazakhstan and the 
Kyrgyz Republic, the cost of finance was indeed a major constraint, even more for small 
firms than medium and large firms. But in the Kyrgyz Republic, many large firms also 
appeared to be constrained by cost more than access to finance, with almost the same 
percentage of large firms and small firms indicating this factor as a major obstacle.  The 
picture is rather different for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where access to finance took 
ascendancy over cost as an obstacle. This is perhaps because these countries have more 
backward property rights arrangements, making it difficult for firms to provide the required 
collateral in order to obtain loans from financial institutions. As small firms were typically 
unable to access finance, cost was not as much of a constraint to small firms as for large 
firms. 




























Source: BEEPS (2005) and author’s calculations. 
The implication of these results is that the best form of government support is again basic 
market reform— state provision of stable property rights is fundamental to financial access 
for enterprises.  In other Central Asian countries that already have these basic conditions, 
reasons for the high finance costs, nevertheless, need to be probed.  If this is due to high 
risk perception of SMEs by banks, then more and sustained special government funded low-
cost loans may be of assistance to further promote SME growth. 
6.4  Characteristics of Bank Loans 
Looking closely at bank loans in Central Asia, the average cost (annual interest rate on 
loans) for all firms was 18%, 400 basis points higher than the average for all transition 
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economies (Figure 12 a–12c). Of the Central Asian countries, only Kazakhstan was right on 
the average for transition countries while the other three
37 have considerably higher cost, 
with Tajikistan having the highest (24%). As expected, small and medium firms borrow at 
much higher costs than large firms, almost 200–300 basis points above the rates for large 
firms.  
The average loan maturity in Central Asia was also shorter by four months than the 
transition countries’ average. In Central Asia, only large firms were able to borrow loans with 
30 months tenor. Kazakhstan, again, was on the mark with the average for all transition 
economies, while Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, had considerably shorter loan maturities. The 
processing of loans also takes longer in Central Asia than the transition economy average, 
by an average of four days. 
The value of required collateral is, surprisingly, lower in Central Asia than the average 
transition economy. Transition countries’ average collateral value is 159% over the value of 
the loan, but Central Asia’s average is 156%. This is because Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
had lower collateral value requirements compared with Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic. 
Interestingly, the range of required collateral values varied for SME and large firms. For 
SMEs, the maximum collateral value requirement went as high as 600% of the loan value, 
while for large firms, the maximum was 450%.  
The collateral required was mostly composed of buildings, machinery, and equipment. Large 
firms had access to more sophisticated inventory and accounts receivables financing, while 
small firms had to use personal property as collateral.  
On the issue of cost, as previously stated, low-cost government funded facilities or 
international donor grants for SMEs might be the best way to provide access to affordable 
financing and relatively longer-term financing for SMEs. The exceedingly high collateral 
requirements in some cases might also be linked to stringent bank regulations or excessive 
risk aversion, which the government could help reduce to more moderate levels.  
                                                  
37 There is no corresponding data for Turkmenistan. 
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Figure 12: Loans in Central Asia:  
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Source: BEEPS (2005) and author’s calculations. 
6.5  Bank Loan Usage by SMEs 
Thirty-eight percent of the Central Asian firms surveyed had a bank loan, while 62% did not 
have loans. Of these, 95% did not apply for a loan while 4% had their application turned 
down, and the remaining few have a pending application. If these percentages held steady 
for the entire Central Asian economy and if a similar structure existed in the 1990s, these 
might help explain why, based on the survey, the 1999 Russian financial crisis appeared to 
have a minimal impact on SMEs. For, if small and medium businesses did not avail 
themselves of loans from the banking system, then financial system disruption would, 
indeed, affect them little.  
Asked for reasons for not using loans, most firms said they had no need for it, which perhaps 
implies that many enterprises are not yet so well versed with dealing with the market 
economy and financial systems. The other major reasons cited are: high cost of borrowing, 
problems with collateral, and burdensome application procedures (see Figure 13). Firms with 
rejected loans attributed the rejection to their lack of acceptable collateral, the financial 
institution perceived a lack of profitability in their enterprise, and the lack of a credit history 
(Figure 14).  
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Source: BEEPS (2005) and author’s calculations. 
























Source: BEEPS (2005). 
7.  SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
SMEs are the backbone of many economies, but in Central Asia, SMEs reaching their full 
potential still lies in the future. They are still new to the workings of the market, many just 
started in the 1990s, while the business and economic environment in which SMEs 
operated, though markedly improved since the beginning of the transition process, remain 
lacking in transparency and regulatory clarity. Yet, although SMEs have operated for only a 
short span of time, many studies already put their contribution to the economy anywhere 
between 31% and 45%, and their contribution to employment somewhere between 25% and 
60%. There are an estimated 11 to 28 SMEs per 1,000 people in Central Asia, more than a 
third of the firms engaged in trade. Almost all small enterprises and more than 80%of 
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medium-sized firms in Central Asia have been started from scratch rather than from 
privatized state-owned enterprises.  
The paper discussed the effect of the Russian and the current global financial crisis on 
Central Asia. While the route which spread the contagion resulting from the 1999 Russian 
financial crisis to Central Asia was primarily through trade links, the current crisis is reaching 
the region directly through financial links, through the global financial illiquidity that is 
adversely affecting Russian and Kazakhstan banks with high foreign indebtedness, and 
through their subsidiaries in Central Asia, the rest of the region. For the first crisis, the paper 
presented some econometric as well as indirect survey data that appear to show that the 
impact of the crisis on SMEs might not have been so dire, compared with their previous 
condition after the Soviet breakup, because their production structure is more flexible than 
large SOEs or large enterprises that are partially owned by the government. In the current 
financial crisis, financing costs for enterprises have increased, including trade finance. But 
the paper conjectures that large firms are going to be harder hit than SMEs because of the 
former’s heavier reliance on foreign bank borrowing and global capital markets. The possible 
adverse impact on SMEs would include weakness in demand, both domestic and foreign, 
which can affect their sales and profits, and thus their capacity to raise financing which, the 
surveys show, SMEs rely upon heavily.  
On government support for SMEs, while government programs designed to promote the 
growth of SMEs are available, including special financial support during the crisis (in the 
case of Kazakhstan), what enterprises most clamor for, according to the survey, are basic 
market reforms. These include transparent and clear regulatory rules, stable property rights, 
lower taxation through the use of international accounting standards, less corruption, and 
better infrastructure. The paper shows slight differences in these concerns across countries 
as well as between large, small, and medium enterprises. The high cost of finance, a top 
concern especially among SMEs, is caused by SMEs being perceived as high risk and by 
their lack of required collateral.  The paper derived implication for the need for  government- 
or international donor-funded financing facilities that could provide cheap, longer term 
financing to SMEs. Just relying on market solutions will always result in very high financing 
costs for SMEs (because that is based on the rational decision taken by private financial 
providers, given the risk of lending to SMEs) and could, thereby, stunt the growth of many 
SMEs. Government assistance is needed to provide the affordable finance that SMEs need 
to grow.  
Government financial assistance to SMEs, however, requires a stable financial system that 
can efficiently funnel government funds to the targeted sector. Here, there is enormous work 
that needs to be done. In some countries, like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the intermediation 
role of banks is still not yet fully appreciated. In these countries, banks still maintain their old 
communist era function as government agents—enforcing monetary and fiscal policy 
through the control of the supply of cash and liquidity, monitoring financial transactions, and 
automatically deducting taxes from depositors’ account on behalf of the tax authorities. In 
addition, in Uzbekistan, the government restriction on cash withdrawals from banks has led 
many SMEs to conduct the bulk of their operations in cash, illegally, rather than go through 
the banking system where they cannot withdraw money from their own accounts, unless it is 
for purposes (within specific categories) allowed by the government.
38  
Even in a country like Kazakhstan, which has more advanced banking systems and 
regulations, there is also a need to more efficiently attract domestic deposits to fund various 
business ventures. Efforts to promote the growth of a domestic pool of funds from local 
deposits have taken a back seat due to the availability of easy money that used to be raised 
                                                  
38 In some cases, this restriction has driven some SMEs out of business. For example, when a small sewing 
company needed to import fabric from abroad, it requested the large factory that ordered it to make an 
advance payment of Som600,000, which was duly deposited in its bank account. But the sewing company was 
unable to withdraw that cash to make the purchase, leading it to default on its contract. 
43 ADBI Working Paper 187    Pasadilla 
 
from abroad. The painful lesson from the global crisis is that the financial system needs to 
rely a lot more on local deposits and domestic savings and lessen the dependence on 
foreign financing.  
More SME financing may also be obtained from non-traditional sources, such as private 
equity funds. While in the past, this group of financing institutions could not enter the 
markets sufficiently due to government ownership restrictions or reluctance to sell SOEs, the 
global crisis has provided an opportunity for new ways of thinking. In particular, financing 
from private equity holds promise in that they have the long-term money necessary to grow 
and develop a business, provided that they are afforded appropriate exit strategies either 
through initial public offerings (IPOs) or sales to a strategic investor of the businesses they 
have developed.  
For trade financing, considering that prepayment is most often required of importers from 
Central Asia, there is a large scope for government or private sector guarantees to create 
liquidity in international transactions. Hence, there is a need to develop functioning export 
credit agencies in Central Asian countries, where few are yet operational. Other steps that 
can be done, especially for Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic where the financial sector 
is relatively stable and more advanced, is to allow more trade finance instruments, other 
than L/Cs, such as factoring, receivables-backed financing, warehouse/inventory receipt 
financing, or supply chain financing, to be used in the country. Whether the government’s 
existing regulatory framework allows for these other types of trade financing is an area that 
should be looked into. 
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